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A reduction of the Soviet  "subsidy  " to Eastern European countries
would impose greater transition costs on them just as they are
attempting to make the drastic adjustments they need to move to
market economies.  How much  of a cost will the switchover  of
their CMEA trade relations impose?
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Economists have delated  whether the Soviet  Based on the assumption that oil would sell
Union subsidized ti.e  with its Eastern European  at about $21 a barrel, Hungary probably will
partners in the Council of Mutual Economic  suffer an income terms-of-trade loss of $1.5
Assistance (CMEA).  billion to $2.15 billion, more than double the
most recently published careful estimate.  In
Effective January 1, 1991, former CMEA  view of the volatile price of oil on world mar-
members implemented their "switchover"  kets, however, the study estimates that for each
decision to convert to world market prices  dollar change in the world price of oil, all energy
denominated in convcrtible currency. The  costs would change by $76 million.
switchover dramatically reduced the rolc of
"state trading" by permitting direct enterprise to  Contrary to conventional wisdom, Oblath
enterprise transactions denominated and settled  and Tarr find that the majority of Hungarian
in convertible currency.  firms exporting to the Soviet Union have been
disfavored by the combination of the payments
Oblath and Tarr made an intensive study of  mechanism, exchange rate, tax, and subsidy
the trading relationship between Hungary and the  policies.
Soviet Union as a case study on the terms-of-
trade issue.  The experience of early 1991 suggests that a
significant decline is likely to occur in Soviet
A detailed empirical investigation of prices  imports from Hungary during the remainder of
in Soviet-Hungarian trade before and after the  the year.  A variety of problems account for the
switchover provides some indication of the  decline, many of them specific to internal
terms-of-trade loss that Hungary is likely to  conditions in the Soviet Union.
suffer as a result of the switchover of its trading
relationship with the Soviet Union.
The PRE Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work under way in the Bank's Policy, Research, and Extemal
AffairsComplex. Anobjective oftheseries is toget thesefindings out quickly, even if presentations are less than fully polished.
The findings, interpretations, and conclusions in these papers do not necessarily represent official Bank policy.
Produccd by the PRE Dissemination CenterThe Terms-of-Trade  Effects from the Elimination
of State Trading in Soviet-Hungarian  Trade
Table of Contents
1.  The Litemature  on the Suviet Subsidization  of Eastern European  Trade  4
2.  The Methodology  7
Overview of the Methcdology  7
3.  The Results  9
The Change in the Income  Terms-of-Trade  9
The Change in the Bilateral  Commodity  Terms-of-Trade  11
Adjusting the Estimates of the Switch-Over  Costs for Changes in the  13
Energy  Sector
4.  Comparison  with other Estimates  15
The Price of Hungarian  Exports  1S
Comparison  with other Recent Estimates  16
5.  Conclusions  18
Appendix 1:  Description  of the Sample  19
Appendix 2:  Explanation  of the Terms-of-Trade  Estimating Fonnulas  22
References  29THE TERMS-OF-TRADE  EFFECTS  FROM  THE ELIMINATION






Whether  the Soviet  Union subsidized  the  trade  with its  Eastern  European
partners  in the  Council  of Mutual  Economic  Assistance  (CMEA)  has  been a  matter
of considerable  debate.  As of January  1, 1991,  the now former  CMEA countries
implemented  their  decision (taken  at the  CMEA  meetings  in  Sofia  during  January
1990)  to convert  to world  market  prices  denominated  in convertible  currency  in
the CMEA (called  the "switch-over");'  thus,  the issue  has become  one of great
practical  importance  to the  Eastern  European  countries  who formerly  comprised
the  CMEA.  A reduction  in the Soviet  "subsidy"  would impose  greater  transition
costs  on their  economies,  due to the  loss  of real  income  it entails,  at a time
when these  economies  are  already  burdened  oith  heavy  transition  costs  as they
struggle  to create  market  economies.
This  paper  contributes  to chis  literature  in five  important  ways:  (1) We
'The  views  expressed  are  those  of  the  authors  and  do  not  necessarily  reflect
the  views  of the  World  bank or Kopint  Datorg.
2The practical means through which this has been accomplished  is by
negotiation  at the  enterprise  to enterprise  level,  with  payment  in convertible
currencies,  i.e.,  by dramaticalLy  reducing  the  role  of the  state  in  trading.  As
explained in World Bank (1991),  world market prices for products such as
machinery will  not,  in  general, be  determined through intergovernmental
negotiation.2
provide  an  update  of the  estimate  for  Hungary.  Previous  estimates  have inid'cated
that  the  Soviet  subsidy  changed  significantly  from  year  to  year,  and  our  estimate
of the Soviet  subsidy  is more than  double  the  Marrese-Wittenberg  estimate  for
1987;  (2)  We introduce  a  new  data  set  which  is  based  on  our  extensive  interview
survey  of experts  in important  Hungarian  enterprises  who engage  in trade  with
the  Soviet  Union;  the  frequently  cited  estimates  of  Marrese-Vanous  (1983),  which
were based on unit values,  have been criticized  for  excessive  adjustment  for
quality.  We  believe  that  our  method,  which  .mplicitly  adjusts  for  quality  based
on  the expert  opinion,  is at least  as reliable;  (3)  we analyze  the  previously
unnoted  methodological  question  of  how to assess  the  terms-of-trade  change  for
the  Eastern  European  countries  who  have  trade  surpluses  in  TR.  There  is  a  problem
in  assessing  the  terms-of-trade  change,  given  that  in  1989  and  1990,  all  Eastern
European  CMEA countries  except  Romania  had a surplus  with the Soviet  Union
denominated  in  an inconvertible  unit  of account,  the  transferable  rouble  (TR); 3
(4)  we show  that  contrary  to  the  conventional  wisdom  on  the  subject,  the  majority
of Hungarian  firms exporting  to the  Soviet  Union  have been disfavored  by the
combination  of the payments mechanism and exchange  rate, tax and subsidy
policies; and (5) we compare  and evaluate  the methodology  of other recent
estimates  of the  terms-of-trade  loss  due  to the  switch-over  in Eastern  Europe.
Based  on data  for  1988,  1989  and  1990,  this  paper  presents  estimates  that
Hungary  will  suffer  a  terms-of-trade  loss  as  a  result  of the  switch-over  to  hard
currency  pricing  with the  Soviet  Union  in  1991.  The  estimate  is  presented  using
two  measures:  the  loss  of income  to  Hungary  (the  income  terms-of-trade)  and  the
3The  uncertain  settlement  of the  TR balance  between the  Soviet  Union and
Hungary  is described  below.3
change  in  the  relative  prices  of  Hungary  in  its  bilateral  trade  with  the  Soviet
Union (what  we call  the  bilateral  commodity  or  barter  terms-of-trade).'  The
estimate  of  the  income  loss  is  that,  based  on  1988  or  1989  quantities  and  prices,
Hungary  would  have  lost  between  $0.8  billion  and  $1.2  billion  as  a  result  of  the
switch-over.  Regarding  the  price  effect,  it is estimated  that  Hungary  would
suffer  an  adverse  impact  in  the  prices  at  which  it  trades  with  the  Soviet  Union
of  between  17  and  24  percent.
The  upper  and  lower  bounds  of the  estimates  derive  from  the  following
extreme  assumptions,  which  are  elaborated  in  more  detail  in  section  3.  If  the
TR  surpluses  were  unredeemable  and  worthless,  then  there  will  be less  terms-
of-trade  shock  to  Hungary  because  Hungary's  terms-of-trade  are  less  favorable
in  its  CMEA  trade  than  TR  pricing  implies;  then  the  lower  estimates  of  the  terms-
of-trade  loss  are  appropriate.  If  the  TR  surpluses  are  fully  redeemable  at  the
TR  prices  of  imports  prevailing  in  CMEA  trade,  then  the  terms-of-trade  of  Hungary
are  more  favorable  in  its  CMEA  trade,  there  will  be  a  larger  terms-of-trade  l'vm
to  Hungary  and  the  larger  estimates  are  appropriate.
Updating  for  the  effects  of  the  developments  in  the  energy  sectors  as  of
early  1991  results  in  an  estimated  income  loss  to  Hungary  of  between  .1.5  and
$2.15  billion,  an  estimate  which  again  depends  on  a  methodological  assumption,
discussed  below.  The  estimates  are  based  on  an assumed  oil  price  of $21  per
barrel.  In  view  of  the  volatile  price  of  oil  on  world  markets,  however,  we  also
estimate  that  for  each  dollar  change  in  the  price  of  oil  on  world  markets,  all
4The  difference  between  the  bilateral  commodity  terms-of-trade  (as  used  in
this  paper)  and  the  commodity  terms-of-trade  [as  used  in  the  literature,  see
Salvatore  (1987)],  is  that  the  former  relates  to  foreign  trade  price  changes  with
a  single  country  only.  The  impact  of  a  change  in  the  bilateral  commodity  terms-
of-trade  on  the  overall  commodity  terms-of-trade  is  given  by  weighting  the  change
in the  bilateral  commodity  terms-of-trade  by the share  of trade  with the
particular  country  in  overall  trade.4
energy  Costs  would  change  by  $76  million.  Consequently,  the  reader  may  calculate
the impact  of a  price change  in oil on the switch-ever  costs  for  any assumed
rrice  of oil  The  estimates  are  summarized  in table  2.
We begin  in  section  1  with  a  brief  overview  of  the  literature  on the  Soviet
subsidy  of trade  in  the  CMEA.  In  section  2  and in  the  mathematical  appendix,  we
discuss  the  principal  methodological  questions  in evaluating  the  costs  of the
switch-over.  Our results  are  presented  in section  3. In section  4, we compare
our estimates  with other  recent  estimates,  and also provide  estimates  of the
impact  of the switch-over  at the sector level.  Mathematical  derivations  and
explanations  of the  data  sources  are  presented  in the  appendices.
1.  THE LITERATURE  ON THE SOVIET  SUBSIDIZATION
OF EASTERN  EUROPEAN  TRADE"
Traditionally  it  was  assumeJ  that  the  Soviet  Union  exercised  political  and
military  power  to  exploit  its  CMEA  partners  through  terms-of-trade  favorable  to
itself  (Holzman,  1985).  In  their  extremely  influential  concribution,  Marrese  and
Vanous  (1983)  reversed  this  presumption.  They  argued  that  the  Soviet  'Jnion  was
selling  "hard"  goods  (fuel  and  raw  materialh L.o  its  CMEA  partners  in  return  for
"soft"  goods  (most  notably  machinery)  at terms-of-trade  very  unfavorable  to  the
Soviet  Union  when proper  account  is taken  for the low quality  of the  Eastern
European  goods.  They  estimated  that  the  average  annual  loss  to the  Soviet  Union
rose  from  $248  million  in  1960  to  $2840  million  in  1978.  Marrese  and  Wittenberg
(1990)  have  updated  the  Marrese  and  Vanous  estimates  for  Hungary;  they  estimate
that  the  Soviet  subsidy  of  Hungary  was $4.2-$4.4  billion  for  1982  and  $250-$530
million  for  1987,  with a fall  in the  price  of oil  accounting  for  80  percent  of
'This  discussion  of  this  section  draws  on the  discussion  by  Balassa  (1990).5
the  decline  in the  subsidy.
Marer (1984)  critie'zed  the  Marrese-Vanous  estimate  for  using  excessive
discounts  for  quality  in  the  calculations,'  and  for  failing  to  take  into  account
that  Eastern  European  type  eou'ipment  is  often  ,)ecially  designed  for  the  Soviet
market  and  may  not  be available  in  the  West. 7 Thus,  although  the  Eastern  European
equipment  way be perfectly  adequate  for  the  Soviet  market,  it  may  be forced  to
sell at large discounts if marketed  in the West, and it was these  Western
discounts  which  formed  the  basis  of  the  Marrese-Vanous  calculations.  As  discussed
below,  however,  the  basic  Marrese-Vanous  results  have  been  replicated  by a  number
of authors;  as a result,  by the  late  1980s  a static  terms-of-trade  loss  to the
Soviet  Union  from its  trade  with Eastern  Europe  was  the  conventional  wisdom.
Whether  the  Soviet  Union  "subsidized"  Eastern  Europe  is  a broader  question.
Erada (1985)  and  Koves (1983)  noted  that the  obligation  to provide  the Soviet
Union with machinery  products  in a rigid state  controlled  framework  provides
little  incentive  for  quality  improvement  or innovation.  Thus,  there  were  almost
certainly  dynamic efficiency  losses involved  in the system. Balassa (1990)
commented  that  the  CMEA  countries  provision  of capital  for  jcint  projects,  such
as pipelines,  at an interest  rate  of about  2 percent  was a subsidy  by Eastern
Europe  to  the  Soviet  Union,  given  that  Euromarket  rate.  9-10  percent  prevailed
"The  actual  way  in  which  Mefrese-Vanous and  Marrese-Wittenberg
(1989)determined  the  world  market  price  of a  product  was  by selecting  a  Western
market  where  a  product  of comparable  quality,  in their  judgement,  was  sold.
'An  example  would  be railroad  cars from  the  former  East  Germany,  which  are
built to the  special  gauge  of the  tracks  in the Soviet  Union,  and  replacement
parts for a network  of 10 year old Soviet  computers,  which are supplied  by
Videoton  in  Hungary.6
and convertible  currency  was used extensively  in the provision  of credit. 8 We
also  note  that  what  is  of  paramount  importance  is  tnar  socialist  economic  systems
were imposed  on most of the countries  of Eastern  Europe  in the  post-World  War
II  era  by the  Soviet  Union.  Were  it  not  for  this  Soviet  imposition  and  continued
control,  many of the economies  would almost certainly  have become market
economies  integrated  into  the  Western  industrial  trading  system  with  standards
of living  comparable  to that  of their  neighboring  countries  in  Western  Europe,
i.e.,  many multiples  of their  present  levels.  Thus,  when  we discuss  the  Soviet
subsidization  of Eastern  Europe  it  must  clearly  be in  some  very  limited  context,
which ignores  the  dramatic  overall  income  reducing  influence  of the  historical
Soviet  presence.
Marrese  and Vanous  contended  that the Soviet  Union subsidized  Eastern
Europe  in  order  to  obtain  political  and  military  allegiance.  Brada  (1988)  noted,
however, that the populations  of the Eastern European  countries  were not
providing  the  sought  after  allegiance,  for  the  populations  objected  to the  loss
of sovereignty;  and the leaders  of the former  Communist  regimes  found Soviet
control  in their  own self  interest,  as is evident  from  the  dramatic  political
upheaval that occurred in all six Eastern European  CMEA countries in 1989
accompanying  the  decline  in the  Soviet  presence.  Moreover,  deviations  from  the
prescribed  Soviet  path  were  suppressed  in  Hungary  and  Czechoslovakia  by  military
means.  Thus, the rationale  for Soviet  subsidies  is not clearly  articulated,
because it appears that the subsidization  bought little support, and the
'In addition, components  of the projects  supplied  by Eastern European
countries  (purchased  in  US dollars)  were  credited  in  TR at the  official  Soviet
exchange  rate  between  the  US dollar  and the  TR which  overvalued  the  TR.7
subservl6nce  was  obtainable  through  milltary  means.*
In  view  of the  arguments  on  the  dynamic  ineffLciencies  entalled  in  the  CMAE
trading  arrangement,  the Eastern  European  subsldies  of a  number of capital
projects  and  the  long  run  impact  of the  Soviet  presence,  we avoid  discussion  of
the  overall  Soviet  subsldizatlon  issue;  rather  we  confine  oursel-'es  to  a  narrower
subject  of the  static  terms-of-trade  loss  of  the  switch-over,  which  we estlmate
for  Hungary  alone. We shall,  however,  int-rchangeably  use the term "subsLdy"
to  be understood  in  this  very limited  sense.
2. THE  METHODOLOGY
Overview  of  the  1.ethodology
The  methodology  ls  elaborated  in  detail  in  two  appendices.  In  appendix  1,
information  on  the  sample,  as  well  a  number  of  technical  detaLls  related  to  table
1 are discussed.  Appendix  2 provides  mathematical  derivations  of the formulas
employed,  demonstrates  that  our  approach  is independent  of the  use  of exchange
rates  (which are  necessarily  arbitrary) as well  as further insight into
comparisons  of our approach  to others.  An overview  of the essential  features,
however, is provided here. Representative  products of major exporting and
importing  b&ancbes  were  selected  and  both  objective  data  and  expert  opinion  were
used  for  estimating  what  the  potential  dollar  prices  of these  products  would  be
9Holzman  (1986)  and  Brada "1985,  1988)  argued  that  market  segmentation  in
the  CMEA explained  the  pattern  of prices,  and  that relative  prices  wit.h2.n  the
Eastern  European  CMEA members  reflected  the same relative  prices  between the
CMEA members  and the Soviet  Union (referred  to as the customs  union  theory  of
CMEA  pricing).  In  particular,  net  exporters  of fuel  and  raw  materials  would  be
subsidy  givers  within  the  CMEA.  Since  Poland,  which  has  better  resource  endowment
than  Hungary,  and is a  net exporter  of energy  and  net imporftr  of  manufactured
goods,  Marrese-Wittenberg  tested  this  proposition  by  comparing  Polish  and  Sovlet
subsidies  to  Hungary.  They  find  mixed  evidence  for  the  customs  union  theory  of
CMEA  pricing:  in  1982  Poland  subsidized  Hungary,  but  in  1987  the  evidence  seems
to support  an interpretation  of Hungarian  subsidies  to Poland.8
if  they  were  traded  in  hArd  currency  with  the  Soviet  Unior..  By  objective  data
we  mean  that  for  homogeneoue  products,  such  as  oil  and  raw  materials,  a  world
market  price  was known  from international  commodity  marktt  quotations.  For
manufactured  goods  however,  this  approach  was  not  possible  because  of  the  great
variation  in  product  quality.  Therefore,  for  heterogeneous  products,  expert
opinion  was  sought.  In  these  cases,  individcuals  from  foreign  trade  orgi.nizations
and  manufacturing  firms  who  were  most  likely  to  have  the  best  information  were
requested  to  give  an  estimate.  In  all  cases  where  expert  opinion  was  sought  an
in  depth  interview  was performed.  Based  on their  knowledge  of the  prices  of
similar  products  on  the  world  ma-.ket  on  the  one  hand,  and  on  conditions  in  the
Soviet  market  on  the  other,  they  were  asked  to  estimate  the  pl_,es  thuir  exports
could  fetch  or  what  they  would  have  to  pay  for  imports,  if  they  were  priced  and
paid  for  in  US  dollars  in  trade  with  the  Soviet  Union.  The  survey  was  conducted
for  the  year  1988.
As  we  discuss  below,  given  the  importance  of  the  terms-of-trade  costs  of
the  switch-over  to  the  Eastern  European  economies,  a  number  of  researchers  have
attempted  to  estimate  the  terms-of-trade  costs  of  the  switch-over  on  the  basis
of somewhat  aggregate  unit value data.  Without  a  detailed  microeconomic
investigation,  however,  these  estimates,  while  useful,  can  only  be  viewed  as
illustrative.  The  serious  alternative  approach  to  ours  is  to  compare  unit  values
at a somewhat  disaggregated  level,  compiled  from  foreign  trade  statistics  --
the approach  adopted  by Gacs (1989)  and Marrese-Wittemberg  (1990).  These
researchers  must  either  choose  representAive  markets  as  Marrese-Wittenberg,  or
choose  a  quality  adjustment  coefficient.  Relying  on  a  small  team  of  researchers
to  make  adjustments  for  product  quality  for  literally  hundreds  of  products  about
which  their  expertise  is  somewhat  limited  presents  problems  that  are  at  least9
as  large  if  not  greater  than  those  in  this  approach.  Thus,  although  this  approach
has  neveral  limitations  which  are  discursed  in  the  appendix,  we  believe  it  should
be viewed  as at least  as goLd  as any  of the  alternatives.
It should  be noted  that  a significant  advantage  of the approach  ir this
paper is that it a-voids  conversions  through  exchangt.;  rates between  roubles,
dollars  and forints.  This fact  is  demonstrated  in the  appendix.  Given  the  fact
that the  forint/rouble  and  rouble/dollar  exchange rates  are  not  market
determined,  it is  desirable  to  avoid  any  conversion  based  on exchange  Lates  and
the  arbitrariness  that  involves.
3.  THE RESULTS
The  Chnge  iAn  the Income  terms-of-trade
The first  measure  discussed  is the  income  terms-of-trade  loss  to Hungary
of the switch-over.  The basic data are presented  in table 1. Based on 1988
quantity  weights  and on the  price  information  for that  year,  the summary  data
are  presented  in column  7.  An explanation  of the  other  columns  is  presented *n
the appendix.  Column 7 indicates  the value Hungarian  exports  would earn in
dollars  and the  value  Hungarians  would  have to pay in dollars  for imports  at
world  market  prices  tn 1988.  Take  machinery  exports  as an exampla.  If the  same
quantity  of Hungarian  machinery  exports  to the  Soviet  Union  were  sold  at world
market  prices  estimated  to  prevail  in 1988,  the  expected  value  of the  earnings
is $2.15  billion  as opposed  to 2.83  billion  TR. If all exports  were sold in
dollars  the expected  earnings  are  $4.1  billion,  and if all imports  were paid
for  in  dollars,  the  expected  value  of Hungarian  payments  is $4.9  billion.  Thus,
the  difference  of $0.8  billion  is the  expected  value  of  the  additional  dollars
that  Hungary  would  have to  pay  as a result  of the  switch-over.10
In order  to arrive  at an estimate  of the income  terms-of-trade  loss,  it
is necessary  to decide  how to  value the  TR surplus  that  existed  in 1988.  One
can note from  ablu  1 that  Hungary  had a  surplus  in its  bilateral  mercahndise
trade  with  the  Soviet  Union  of  0.4  billion  TR in  1988.  The  surplus  was  about  the
same  in 1989,  but rose  to over  0.6  billion  TR in 1990.
One extreme  is to  assume  that  the  TR surpluses  are  valueless,  i.e.,  that
the export  and import  bundle of goods  was the best deal that Hungary could
negotiate  with  the  Soviet  Union,  and  Hungary  would  never  receive  any  compensation
in goods  or services  for  these  surpluses.  Then $0.8  billion  is the  estimate  of
the  income  terms-of-trade  loss,  because  it  values  the  TR surpluses  at zero.
At the  other  extreme  is to assume  that  the  TR surpluses  would  have  been
redeemable  in full for goods  and services  from the Soviet  Union at relative
prices  for  imports  prevailing  in 1988.  Under  this  assumption  it is  necessary  to
assign  a dollar  value to the  TR surplus  at the relative  prices  that  prevailed
in 1988.  This  is  appropriately  done  by counterfactually  reducing  the  vector  of
export  quantities  and  increasing  the  vector  of  import  quantities
equiproportiorately  such  that  trqde  is  balanced  in  TR.  Assessing  the  total  dollar
value  of these  counterfactually  produced  vectors  of exports  and imports  yields
an expected  value  for  the  dollar  loss  from  the  switch-over  of  $1.23  billion.'°
Which  of  these  estimates  is  closer  to  being  correct?  The  great  uncertainty,
which  prevailed  in 1989  and early  1990,  of if and  when the  TR surpluses  would
be exchanged  for  goods in the future  suggests  that the  TR surpluses  were  not
valued  in full  at the  relative  prices  prevailing  in  1988,  so the  estimate  $1.23
t0Hungary's  bilateral trade balance with the Soviet Union is
likely to be negative in 1991. Since we are estimating terms-of-
trade effects, we ignore quantity effects which would  affect the
trade balance.11
billion  ia  too  high.  This  uncertainty  contributed  to  the  system  of licensing
Hungarian  exports  to the  Sovlet  Union  ln  early  1990.  On the  other  hand,  the
settlement  of  the  Hungarian-Soviet  Union  TR  balance  appeared  to  be  resolved  with
the  agreement  to  convert  Hungary's  accumulated  TR  surplus  Ath the  Sovlet  Union
into  a  dollar  amount  to  be  used  for  the  purchase  of  Soviet  goods  or  to  finance
a  bilateral  trade  deficit  at  the  rate  of  $0.92  - 1  TR.  This  indicated  that  the
TR  surpluses  have  value,  and  the  estimate  of  $0.8  billion  is  too  low.  The  Soviet
Union,  however,  has  presented  some  counter  claims  against  Hungary  (for  example,
for  improvements  to  buildings  its  departing  military  is  leaving  behind),  and,
more  importantly,  the  time  period  over  which  these  surpluses  could  be  redeemed
remained  unresolved  as  of  Harch  1991;  the  Hungarian  government  wanted  a  one  year
period  and  the Sovlet  Union  a five  year  period.  If a five  year  period  were
agreed,  then  the  surpluses  would  have  to  be  discounted  significantly.
The  ChAnge  in  the  Bilateral  Commodity  terms-of-trade
The  counterpart  to the  income  loss  from  a terms-of-trade  change  is  the
change  in  prices,  which  is  naturally  based  on  the  commodity  terms-of-trade,  i.e.,
an  index  of  the  price  of  exports  divided  by  an  index  of  the  price  of  imports.
Given  the  importance  of  the  Soviet  trade  for  Hungary,  we  define  such  indices  with
respect  to  the  Soviet  Union  alone.  The  percentage  change  in  the  ratio  of the
price  index  of exports  to the  price  index  of imports  in the  Soviet  Union-
Hungarian  trade  we define  as  the  percentage  change  in  the  bilateral  commodity
terms-of-trade.
Similar  to  the  calculations  regarding  the  income  terms-of-trade  we  must
make  an  assumption  regarding  how  to  value  the  trade  surpluses  with  the  Soviet
Union.  Again,  at  one  extreme  is  the  assumption  that  they  are  valued  in  full  at12
the  relative  prices  in  TR prevailing  in 1988,  i.e.,  that  Hungary  would  be able
to  convert  its  TR surpluses  with the  Soviet  Union  into  imports  from the  Soviet
Union at the TR prices  prevailing  in 1988. In that case the TR prices that
prevailed  in  1988  are the  relevant  prices  for  defining  the  price  index  in 1988,
and  the  estimated  dollar  prices  are  relevant  for  defining  the  price  indices  after
the switch-over.  We show in the  appendix  that  based  on 1988 initial  data,  the
change  in the  bilateral  commodity  terms-of-trade  is the  ratio  of the  weighted
average  export  relative  price (.864)  to the  weighted  average  import  relative
price (1.134)  or 0.762.  That is,  the  terms-of-trade  would  shift  adversely  for
Hungary  by almost  24  percent.
The other  extreme  is to assume  that  the  TR surpluses  were  valueless.  In
this  case the  TR prices  are  not  the  relevant  prices  with  which  to construct  the
price  indices,  because  they  are  not the  prices  at  which  Hungary  can import.  The
appropriate  TR prices  would  be the counterfactually  created  TR price  vectors
where  export  prices  are  reduced  and  import  prices  are  increased
equiproportionately  such  that  there  is no trade  surplus  in  TR.  This  means  that
the true terms-of-trade  under  the  protocols  in 1988  are  worse than  the terms-
of-trade  based  on  unadjusted  TR  prices;  consequently  the  switch-over  would  cause
less  of an adverse  effect  on the  terms-of-trade.  Making  this  adjustment,  it is
necessary  to decrease  TR export  prices  and  increase  import  prices  in TR by 4.5
percent  in  order  to  create  a  zero  trade  balance  in  TR  with  fixed  quantities.  Then
the  change  in  the  terms-of-trade  is  reduced  to 17  percent.  This  is  obtained  from
the  ratio  of the counterfactually  created  export  relative  price index  of .901
to the  import  relative  price  index  of 1.083,  which  is .832.
Thus,  we estimate  that  had  the  switch-over  occurred  in  1988,  the  bilateral
commodity  terms-of-trade  with  the  Soviet  Union  would  have  moved  adversely  against13
Hungary  between  17 and  24 percent.
Adjusting  the  Estimates  of  the  Switch-Over  Costs  for  Changes  in  the  Energy  Sector
Due  to volatility  in the  price  of energy  products  it is useful  to  update
the  estimates  for  energy  price  changes;  these  are  presented  in table  2. Based
on dollar  prices  that prevailed  in February  1991 and TR prices  in 1990,  the
relative  price  in  the  mining  sector  would  increase  to  1.39  and  the  relative  price
in the  electricity  sector  would increase  to 1.57."  Though  the  relative  prices
for other industries  (product  groups)  might also have changed,  there is no
information  of any comparably  important  change  in the  relative  price  of other
industries  as that  of energy  products.  Using  1990  quantity  weights,  results  in
an estimate  of  an additional  cost  to  Hungary  of the  switch-over  of  $700  million
(for  a total  cost of between  1.5  and 1.9  billion  dollars),  and an additional
adverse  movement in the bilateral  terms-of-trade  of 13 percent (for  a total
adverse  movement  of  between  30 and  37 percent).
There  is  a  methodological  question  regarding  whether  1988  or  1990  quantity
weights  would  be most  appropriate.  Since  the  volume  of trade  between  the  Soviet
Union  and  Hungary  declined  by  about  30  percent  in 1990  relative  to  1988  or 1989,
the  choice  between  1990  and  either  of  the  previous  two  years  is  significant.  One
view is that one should  use 1990 quantity  weights if 1990 prices are being
employed.  To  assess  the  "subsidy"  that  Hungary  actually  received  from  the  Soviet
"We assume  a price of $21 per barrel (and  7.4 barrels  per metric  ton),
which  is  based  on the  spot  price  of a  barrel  of oil  during  early  February  1991.
The relative  prices  of natural  gas,  coal  and  electricity  are  calculated  on the
basis of TR prices  of 1990 and actual  contractual  prices  between  Hungary  and
the Soviet  Union during  early 1991.  The increase  in the relative  price also
derives  from  a decrease  in the  TR price  of oil  between  1988  and 1990 (from  133
to 96 TR per metric ton of oil),  due to the 5 year moving  average  Bucharest
formula.14
Union in 1990,  this  would  be the  correct  procedure. Another  view is that  the
Soviet  Union  cut  deliveries  to  Hungary  of oil  in 1990  to force  Hungary  to incur
some of the switch-over  costs in 1990. That is, if the Soviet  Union had a
continued  commitment  to  the  CMEA  system,  it  would  have  made  an  effort  to  maintain
deliveries  to the  CMEA partners,  rather  than  sell to the  West for  convertible
currency.  t
2 Then one could  counterfactually  evaluate  what the Soviet  "subsidy"
to Hungary  would  have  been in 1990,  if it  had maintained  deliveries  in 1990  at
the level of 1988. Using 1988 quantities  and the prices of the previous
paragraph,  results  in  an additional  cost  of  the  switch-over  of $950  million  (for
a total  cost of  between  1.75  and 2.15  billion  dollars).
Since  the  prices  of  energy  products  are  subject  to  considerable  volatility,
we also  estimate  the  change  in the  Soviet  "subsidy"  to  Hungary  for  each  dollar
change  in the  price  of oil (taking  into  account  the impact  of a change  in the
price of oil on other energy  prodcuts).  Based on 1990 quantity  weights,  we
estimate  that the  switch-over  costs  to Hungary  will  change by $76  million  for
each dollar change in the price of a barrel of oil."
3 Using this estimate of the
subsidy  per  dollar  per  barrel,  the  reader  may  easily  calculate  the  change  in  the
"O0f  course,  part  of the  reason  for  the  cut  in  Soviet  deliveries  to Eastern
Europe  was  domestic  production  problems.  But,  deliveries  of  oil  to  Eastern  Europe
fell  more  than  in  proportion  to the  drop  in  production  or in  sales  to  the  West.
' 3The  estimate  is  derived  using  the following  methodology.  In  1990  Hungary
imported  32.9  million  barrels  of oil  from  the  Soviet  Union.  Thus,  a one dollar
increase  in the  price  of  oil  will increase  the  cost  of  oil  from  the  Soviet  Union
by $32.9  million.  In addition,  a  one dollar  increase  in the price of oil is
estimated  to increase  the cost of non-oil  energy  imports  by $43 million.  The
latter  number  is derived  from  the  fact  that  non-oil  energy  imports  represented
67  percent  of the  total  value  of  Hungarian  energy  imports  from  the  Soviet  Union
in 1990, and Hungarian government  and  industry  sources estimate that the
proportional increase in non-oil energy costs will be 65 percent of  the
proportional increase in  the  cost  of  oil,  i.e.,  $43  million - $32.9
million*(67/33)*(.65).15
Soviet subsidy to Hungary foi.  any estimted future price of a barrel of oil."
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4. COMPARISON  WITH  OTHER  ESTIMATES
The  Price  of  Hungarian  Exports
Before  comparing  our  estimates  to  others,  we first  discuss  some  data  that
will be useful in assessing  other  estimates.  Despite  the fact that  Hungarian
exports  are  of  lower  quality  than  Western  products,  our  investigation,  summarized
in table 3, finds that Hungarian exporters  would have been able to obtain
considerably  more in domestic  currency  by selling  for  convertible  currency  in
the  Soviet  Union than  by selling  in transferable  roubles.' 5 In column  3  of the
export  section  of the table,  one  can  observe  (by  sector)  the  number  of forint
an untaxed Hungarian exporter (or importer)  is expected to earn (pay)  by
exporting  and selling for dollars  compared  to transferable  roubles.  For the
exporting  enterprise  itself,  its  incentives  are  dependent  on  the  system  of  trade
taxes and subsidies.  In column  6, we note that all sectors  except  the food
processing  industry  expected  to  earn  more  in  domestic  currency  after  the  switch-
over.  t6 These  data show that the microeconomic  incentives to Hungarian
4As  mentioned  above,  part of the  increased  switch-over  costs  attributible
to using  updated  energy  prices  derives  from  a reduction  in the  TR price  of oil
in  1990  relative  to 1988.  Thus,  only  adjusting  the  dollar  price  of oil  will  not
totally  eliminate  the  difference  in  the  estimate  of  the  switch-over  costs  between
1988  and 1990.
'6Based  on a recent  survey  of Polish  enterprises,  Rosati  (1990)  has found
similar  results  in Poland.
'It is  assumed  in  column  6  that  the  subsidies  and  taxes  on trade  among  the
former  CMEA countries  will  be eliminated.  (We  ignore  MFN tariff  rates  and any
export  subsidies  which  will be uniformly  applied.)
The  actual  situation  may  vary  as  well  because  of  the  costs  of  the  exporting
(continued...)16
enterprises after  the  switch-over  are  consistent with  the  macroeconomic
adjustment  required  due  to  the  terms-of-trade  loss,  i.e.,  more  exports  and  less
imports.
Comparison  with other  Recent  Estimates
It is intutive,  based  on the  data  of table  3, that  it  does  not  make  sense
to assess  the  terms-of-trade  loss  to  Hungary  by examining  only  a  portion  of the
import  and  export  bundle  employing  TR-dollar  exchange  rates.  Rather,  the  whole
bundle  of imports  and  exports  must  be  assessed  to  determine  how  much  exports  the
Eastern  European  countries  are  giving  up in  return  for  the  oil  and  other  imports.
In  particular,  Vanous  (1990)  has  estimated  the  Soviet  subsidy  of  Eastern  European
oil  purchases  alone,  by introducing  what  he terms  as a realistic  exchange  rate
of  the  TR  for  the  dollar  (based  on the  Hungarian  cross-exchange  rate).  Employing
the  same logic  and  exchange  rate  would  imply  (from  table  3) that  the  Hungarian
machinery  exports  were subsidizing  the Soviet  Union,  which  would reduce  the
overall  Soviet  subsidy."17
t8{  ... continued)
enterprise  of its  energy  inputs  will  likely  increase,  payment  will  be less  rapid
due to the  cancellation  of the "prompt  encashment  system,'  and the  government
may  impose  taxes  to  compensate  for  the  loss  of  trade  taxes.  When  these  other  cost
increases  are taken into  consideration,  the  exporting  enterprise  may not find
that its  unit  profitability  inproves  after  the  switch-over.
"There  is an old joke in Eastern  Europe  about  a man who claims  to have
sold his ugly dog for $1000.  The astonished  listener  ultimately  discovers,
however,  that  the  man  received  no cash  for  his  dog.  Rather,  he  received  in  return
two  cats,  for  which  he claims  to  have  paid $500  each.  Examining  either  side  of
the  sale separately would  reveal a  great subsidy relative to  a  market
transaction.
Another  way to see  this is  to  suppose  that  all  prices  in  TR were  doubled,
with  no change  in  any  exchange  rate.  Then  the  terms-of-trade,  which  are  defined
by relative  prices  in  TR are  unchanged;  but  a calculation  of the  subsidy  would
be reduced  by 50  percent  based  on oil imports.  One  could  argue  that  a doubling
(continued...)17
Due to the importance  of the issue  of the  switch-over  costs,  there  have
been  a  number  of  efforts  at  estimating  these  costs  based  on  rather  aggregate  unit
value  data  without  a microeconomic  investigation  of product  quality. 1" The  most
systematic  of these is  Kenen (1990).  He has estimated  the terms-of-trade  loss
as a  result  of the  switch-over  based  on 1989  quantities  and  unit  value  data for
Bulgaria,  Czechoslovakia,  Hungary,  Poland  and  Romania,  but calls  his estimates
illustrative.  Konen's  calculations  involve  the  valuation  of  the  import  and  export
bundle using domestically  applicable  cross exchange  rates of the TR to the
dollar,  with adjustments  as he deems  appropriate.  In the  case of Hungary,  he
estimates  it  will lose  approximately  $2.08  billion  and its  bilateral  commodity
terms-of-trade  will deteriorate  by 36.7  percent.  Based  on the  data  of table  3,
we believe  these  estimates  are  too  high  for  1989;  they  failed  to  adjust  prices
of the  industrial  consumer  goods  sector  and  prices  of the  machinery  sector  were
adjusted  in the  opposite  direction  indicated  by the  data  of table  3.19
In  unpublished  notes,  Marrese  has estimated  the  terms-of-trade  effect  of
the  switch-over  for  the  six  Eastern  European  CMEA  countries.  He assumed  that  the
1( ...  continued)
of  all import  and  export  prices  in  TR  will induce  the  authorities  to  appreciate
the domestic currency  against the TR. A proportionate  appreciation  of the
domestic  currency  will leave everything  unchanged.  The example,  nonetheless
emphasizes  that it is best to avoid  a calculation  which is so dependent  on a
somewhat  arbitrary  exchange  rate.
' 8See,  for example,  Institute  of International  Finance (1990)  and  Havlik
(1990).  No explanation  of the  methodology  is  available  in these  studies.
19Data  in  Marrese  and  Wittenberg  (1990)  suggest  a  quality  adjustment  similar
to that  indicated  by table  3.  They  found  that  the  prices  of Hungarian  machinery
goods  sold  in the  Soviet  Union  were far  lower  than  comparable  Hungarian  exports
sold  in  the  West (about  80  percent  lower  even  after  their  adjustment  for  product
quality).18
relative  prLces  that  prevailed  in 1987  (estimated  in the  Harrese-Wittenberg
study)  continued  to  prevail  in  later  years,  with  the  exception  of  energy  prices.
For  1990  his  estimate  (with  $21  per  barrel  oil)  o' $1.9  billion  is  at  the  upper
range  of  our  comparable  estimate  (row  2 table  2).0
5.  CONCLUSIONS
This  paper  has  surveyed  the  literature  on  the  Soviet  "subsidy"  to  Eastern
Europe  and  concluded  that,  given  the  overall  income  reducing  effect  of  the  Soviet
presence,  a Soviet  subsidy  can  only  be  interpreted  in  the  limited  context  of  a
static  terms-of-trade  loss.  This  paper  has  introduced  a  new  data  set,  which  is
based  on interviews  of experts  in  the  respective  product  categories,  for  the
purpose  of  analyzing  the  static  terms-of-trade  loss  that  Hungary  is  likely  to
suffer  as  a  result  of  the  switch-over  in  1991  of  its  trading  relationship  with
the  Soviet  Union.  We believe  that  these  data  are  at  least  as  reliable  as  the
principal  alternative  data  sources,  which  are  based  on  selection  of  unit  values
from  markets  defined  as comparable  by the  researcher.  We have  analyzed  the
'Seminar  entitled,  "The  Cost  to  Central-East  Europe  of  the  Disintegration
of  the  CMEA  and  the  1990  Oil  Price  Increase,"  at  the  OECD-World  Bank  conference
on "the  Transition  to  a  Market  Economy  in  Central  and  Eastern  Europe,"  Paris,
November  28-30,  1990.  Marrese's  estimates  for  1988,  however,  are  considerably
less  than  ours;  in  fact,  he  finds  that  Hungary  "subsidized"  the  Soviet  Union  in
1988.  Since,  as  we  explain  in  appendix  2,  for  the  same  relative  prices,  Marrese's
estimates  of  the  Soviet  subsidy  to  Hungary  will  be  larger  than  our  lower  bound
estimate,  the  fact  that  he  has  a lower  estimate  than  us  for  1988  of  the  Soviet
subsidy  must  derive  from  different  relative  price  estimates.  Marrese,  however,
did  not update  his and  Wittenberg's  microeconomic  investigation  of relative
prices  (other  than  in  energy)  from  1987.
We  also  note  that  Marrese's  estimate  of  the  terms-of-trade  loss  to  Hungary
at $26 per barrel  is 27 percent  greater  than  our midpoint  estimate;  this
indicates  that  his  estimates  are  more  sensLtive  than  ours  to  a change  in  the
price  of  oil,  apparently  due  in  part  to  an  assumption  of  a greater  percentage
pass-through  to  the  natural  gas  and  electricity  sectors  than  we  have  assumed.19
previously  unnoted methodological  question of how to assess terms-of-trade
changes  for  countries  that  have unredeemable  trade  surpluses.  In table  2, the
paper  has  provided  a range  of updated  estimates  of the  terms-of-trade  loss  for
Hungary, taking into account the unredeemable  surplus problem as well as
different  quantity  weights  and energy  prices.  Based  on oil  at $21  per  barrel,
the estimates  are that Hungary  will suffer  an income  terms-of-trade  loss of
between $1.5 billion and $2.15  billion,  which is more than double the most
recently published estimate. In  table 3, we have shown that contrary to
conventional  wisdom, the majority  of Hungarian  firms  exporting  to the Soviet
Union have  been disfavored  by the  e^,rlination  of the  payments mechanism, exchange
rate, tax and subsidy policy. Finally,  we have compared  and evaluated  the
methodology  of other  estimates  of the  terms-of-trade  changes  due  to the  switch-
over in Eastern  Europe.
Based  on  early  1991  experience,  It  appears  that  there  will  be  a  significant
decline  in Soviet  imports  from  Hungary  in 1991.  The reduction  in the  quantity
of Soviet  imports  is related  to a variety  of problems,  many internal  to the
Soviet  Union,  which  are  beyond  the  scope  of this  paper. 2" Since  we are  estimating
terms-of-trade  effects  only,  we ignore  the  quantity  effects  in this  paper.  The
reductions  in the  quantity,  however,  appear  to be at least  as important  as the
price  changes  from  the  macroeconomic  perspective  of Hungary.
APPENDIX  1
DESCRIPTION  OF THE  SAMPLE
1.  In  this  appendix  we use  the  term  industry  to  refer  to  one  of the  ten  broad
aggregates  of  products  listed  in  table  1,  and  we use the  term  products  to  refer
21See  Tarr (1991)  for  a discussion  of these  issues.20
to subsectors  of the  industry  aggregates.  For  exami  le,  mining  and  machinery  are
two of the industries;  and oil is a product  within the  mining industry.  Our
sample  selected  representative  products  of exporting  and importing  industries.
Products  were included  in the  sample,  as a rule,  based  on their  importance  in
Hungarian-Soviet  bilateral  trade  (like  buses  and  grain  in  Hungarian  exports,  and
crude  oil and  Lada cars in  Hungarian  imports).  Column  1 presents  the  value  of
Hungarian  imports  from and exports  to the Soviet  Union  by industry  in TR, and
column  2 presents  the  share  of each industry  in total  exports  or imports.  In
column  4, an indication  of  how large  the  sample  was in  relation  to  the industry
is provided.  For example,  the sample  of metallurgy  exports  products  was 76.9%
of total Hungarian  metallurgy  exports  to the Soviet  Union. Column 3 equals
column  4 times  column  2,  and  is  an  indication  of  how  large  the  sample  is  in  total
trade.  The sum of column  2 indicates  that the  products  sampled  were 52.2%  of
total  Hungar 4 an  exports  to  the  Soviet  Union  and  62.1%  of  total  Hungarian  imports.
2.  For the selected  products  which  were  homogeneous,  prices  were available
from  international  commodity  markets.  For  products  subject  to  quality  variation,
information  on the potential  dollar  price  of exported  (imported)  products  to
(from)  the  Soviet  Union  was  requested.  The  ratio  of  the  potential  dollar  prices
to actual  transferable  rouble  prices  were defined  as relative  prices  for  each
product  in the sample.  First,  relative  prices  for industries  were calculated
(column  5)  by weighting  the  relative  prices  of products  within  industries. In
all, data were collected  on the  relative  prices  of 54 export  products  and  47
import  products.
2The  shares  of  the  representative  products  within  industries  were  increased
equiproportionately  such that the  sum of the  shares  equaled  unity.  The scaled
up shares  were then  used as the  weights.21
The  relative  prices  for  industries  were  aggregated  into  overall  export  and
import  relative  prices  using  as  weights  the  share  of  each  industry's  exports
(imports)  in  total  TR  exports  (imports),  yielding  .864  for  exports  and  1.134  for
imports."  For  industries  with  a lower  share  in  exports  or  imports  than  1  per
cent,  no  sample  was  taken.  In  those  cases,  the  sample  average  was  used.
3.  In  cases  where  there  were  multiple  estimates  from  experts  regarding  the
dollar  price  or  when  only  a  minimum-maximum  range  of  prices  could  be  estimated
(for  example,  when  the  product  was  not  actually  traded  in  dollars),  the  mean  of
the  estimates  was  taken  as  "the"  estimate  for  the  product.  On  the  basis  of  these
actual  or  estimated  dollar  prices  in  roubles  on  the  one  hand,  and  their  actual
foreign  trade  prices  in  roubles  on  the  other,  relative  prices  were  determined
for  each  selected  product.  These  relative  prices  indicate  the  amount  of  dollars
that  would  have  to  be  paid  in  case  of  imports,  or  could  be  received  in  case  of
exports  for,  the  unit  of  any  product  bought  or  sold  for  one  rouble  in  Hungarian  -
Soviet  trade.
23 Another  average,  which  was  called  the  sample  average,  was  calculated  by
taking  the  weighted  average  of  the  price  relatives  of  the  individual  products
in  the  sample.  The  weights  were  obtained  by  taking  the  shares  of  the  products
in  overall  imports  and  exports  and  increasing  the  shares  equiproportionately
such  that  the  weights  summed  to  unity.  The  sample  average  was  used  as  the  price
relative  for  the  small  industries  for  which  a  sample  was  not  performed.?2
APPENDIX  2
EXPLANATION  OF THE TERHS-OFoTRADE  ESTIMATING  FORMULAS
In  this  appendix  we  elaborate  the  mathematical  relationships  that
are  the  basis  of  the  estimates  in  the  text.  In  the  process,  we  clarify
some  of  the  distinctions  made  in  the  text,  and  compare  our  methodology
to  that  of  Marrese  and  his  coauthors.  First,  it  is  necessary  to  define
some  notation.  Let:
PE$  - the  export  price  of  good  i  in  US  dollars
PE  TR.the export  price  of  good  i  in  transferable  roubles
PM$  - the  import  price  of  good  i in  US  dollars i
PM  TR-  the  import  price  of  good  i in  transferable  roubles
Xi  the quantity  of  exports  of  good  ito the  Soviet  Union
Mi  . the  quantity  of  imports  of  good  i  from  the  Soviet  Union
Then
TB($)  - Z  XiPEv  - M  M  $PM  - the  bilateral  trade  balance  with  the
Soviet  Union  in  dollars,  and
TB(TR)  - 2  X  PER - I  H  PMT - the  bilateral  trade  balance  with
i  i i
the  Soviet  Union  in  transferable  roubles.
The  gi&Luda  IQ  WW9li3ang  LewQX  Bund kLMaL
In  table 1,  we  obtained  the  lower bound estimate  of  the
terms-of-trade  loss  through  the  use  of  the  following  formula:
(1)  - 4  - XiPE  [PE?/PEi  v  MiPM  i [P/PMi/  I
i.e., by  multiplying  the exports and  imports  of  each sector
denominated  in TR by the relative  price  from  our survey.  Clearly,
multiplication  within  the terms of the summation  in  equation  (1)
yields:  SL  - -TB($).
Thus,  the approach  of table  1, which  takes  the fixed  transferable
rouble  values  and  multiplies  by the  relative  price,  is  equivalent  to
taking  fixed  quantity  weights  and  valuing  this  bundle  of exports  and
imports  in  dollars.  That  is,  it  produces  an  answer  to  the  question  of:
if the same bundle  of exports  and imports  were traded  at dollar
prices,  how  much  extra  would  have  to  be  paid  in  dollars.  If  this  valueL  -3
is  negative,  as it is in table  1, it indicates  that  Hungary  will have
to pay out dollars  for the same bundle  of imports  and exports.  Thus,
we say that Hungary will suffer  a  terms-of-trade  loss equal to the
negative  of TB($).
The-  Subidy  to  jungary:  R  Bound  Estmatg
The calculation  in  equation  (1)  values  the  surplus  in  TR at zero.
An  alternative  assumption  is to assume  that it is redeemable  at the
relative prices  that prevailed in 1988, so  that the switch-over
results in a further  loss of income  due to the loss of the  value of
the TR trade surplus.  We do this by equiproportionately  decreasing
exports  and increasing  imports  such  that the  trade  balance  is  balanced
in  TR;  we then  value  this  balanced  trade  balance  in dollars.
Choose  a 6, where  0 <  6  <  1, such  that
TB (TR)  - (1-6)XiPEi - (1+6)M  - O
i  iii 
Then:
(2)  TB (TR)  - TB(TR) - 6  [ XPETR T  MiPPMTR]  - 0.
i  i
That is,  the  second  term  on the  right  hand side  of equation  (2)  is the
trade  surplus denominated in TR.  We  value  this counterfactually
created trade  balance, TB (TR) in dollars  at the relative  prices of
1988 to obtain  the upper bound estimate  of the income  terms-of-trade
loss.  Focusing  on the second  term  on the  right  hand side  of (2)
6 (E  XiPE T(PE$/PET  ]  +  R  PMTR[PM$i/PMT  1)
i  i  i  i  i  MIPi  (Pi 
- 5(1 X PE$ +  E MiPM$]  - the  TR trade  surplus  valued  in  dollars.
i  i 
Since,  TB(TR)  when  valued  in  dollars  at 1988 relative  prices  is  TB($),
the  upper  bound estimate  of the  Hungarian  terms-of-trade  loss is  equal
to:
(3)  u  S  -TB($)  +  6[1  X PE$  + I  Mi  i
u  i  ~~i  i 
which exceeds the lower  bound estimate  by the amount of the second
term  on the  right  hand side  of (3).
ComRarison  k  shA  Mgthodolv  2Q  NAjXMA
Marrese  defines  the  Soviet  subsidy  to Hungary  as:
(4)  S  -TB($)  +  (E  XiPEi  - E  MiPMi)/ER
H  ~~~~i  i
where PEF is the export  price of good i  defined  in Hungarian  forint, i
PMF  is the import  price  of good i  defined  in  Hungarian  forint,  and  ER$ i
is the number of forint one receives  for a dollar at the official
exchange  rate in Hungary,  i.e, about  60 in late 1990.  In (4)  we have
reversed the  signs  of  Marrese's formula, since  he  defines  the21.
Hungarian subsidy to the Soviet  Union. How does (4) compare to our
estimates?
In the  Hungarian  trade  data  we have that
F  TR  TR  T PEi - PE  ER  where ER  is the number of forint  received  for a
transferable rouble  in  Hungary at  the  official  exchange  rate.
Consequently,  the  second  term  in (4)  is equal  to
(5)  z  XiPE$  - E  M  PM$t  ,  where  the  dollar  prices  in (5)  are  obtained
i  i
at the cross-rate  of the rouble  to the dollar that prevails  at the
official  exchange  rates  in Hungary.  That is, the  Marrese estimate  is
equal to the value of the bundle  of exports  and imports  in dollars
(our lower bound estimate of the terms-of-trade  loss) plus the TR
surplus valued at the cross-exchange  rate of the TR to the dollar
prevailing  in  Hungary.
To the  extent  that the  second  term in (4)  differs  from the  second
term in (3), our upper bound estimate  will differ from Marrese.  We
have preferred  to avoid the  use of exchange  rates  that are  not market
determined,  because of the arbitrariness  that is involved  in their
use. We believe,  however,  that  a clear  upper  bound  on the  valuation  of
the  TR surplus  is  the  assumption  that  the  TR suurplus  is  redeemable  at
the  relative  prices  that  prevailed  in  1988,  as  calculated  by  our  upper
bound estimate. Our  lower bound estimate  will differ from Marrese
because  it  places  a  zero  value  on the  TR surplus.
The Bilateral  Commodity  TerMs-of-Trade:
The  terms-of-trade  is  defined  as  the  number  of  units  of  exports
necessary  to  obtain  a  unit  of  imports.  For  a  convertible  currency
country,  it would be: TOT - PE/PM.  With many comodities, the export
and  import prices  are  indices which  we  now  construct for  the
Soviet-Hungary  trade.  Define:
VX - E  X PET  ;  VM - M
i  i
- TR  H  TR ae _  X  XPE  /VX;  i  PM  v.
i  _  i  - 1.
Cas LL  lue  Aa  Eimgd  uatAte.  RdoneMabla  IB  Suroluses
First consider, the case where the TR surplus is fully redeemable.
Then we define:
PEO  aX  PE  TR;  P(O  OPMTh
ii  i,  i
PE1  aX PE$;  and  PM1  -I1  PM$
Then  (PEL  /PM1]/[PE  /PM  ]  is  the  proportional  change  in  the
terms-of-trade.  Rerranging  and  substituting  yields:75
(6) (PEl/PMl1/,PEO/p  0  aI  (PE$/PE  1)/(E  aM (PM$I/PM  TR),
i  i 
which  from  table  I is equal  to: .864/1.134  - .764.  Thus  our upper
bound estimate  of the adverse  shift in the bilateral  commodity
terms-of-trade  is  23.6  percent.
Case  JL  Lower  god  Estimags  Unredeemable  IM  Sug2uses
Analogous  to the income  terms-of-trade  calcualtion,  if the  TR
surplus  is  unredeemable,  then  the  pre-existing  terms-of-trade  are  not
as  good  as revealed  by the  prices  defined  in  TR.  In  this  case,  it  is
necessary  to adjust  the  index  of  prices,  such  that  the  trade  balance
is  eliminated,  i.e.,  define:
PE - 1_)  TR  14m  TR
PE  (1-6)  PEi  P  - (1+6)  PM1  ,  where  6 was
def  ined  in this  appendix  above.  Then  the  proportional  change  in the
terms-of-trade  are  equal  to:
$/pTR])/  K  $  TR ((1+6)1(1-6)]lE  O  X[  /P1  4H  Q  P  /PMi  1)  - [(1+6)/(1-6)](.762)
- .83.
Thus,  the  adverse  shift  in  the  bilateral  commodity  terms-of-trade  is
only  17  percent  if  we  regard  the  TR  surpluses  as  unredeemable.26
Table  1. Irnc  term of  trae calculations  from  effects  of  switching  to  dollar  payments  in
Hunarien-Soviet  trade,  1988
Exports  Actual  Share  ln  Share  of  Share  of  Price  Value  In
1988  value  actusl  trade  saple  in  sasplo  in  relatives  1000  USD
(1000  TRbt)  total  trade  branch's  trade  (USD/TRbi)  Kean
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)
Mining  39,529  0.8X  *  35,515
Electricity  2.919  0.1X  *  2,622
Notallurgy  134,648  2.8X  2.172  76.9X  2.182  293,784
Machinrry  2833,761  59.52  26.20X  44.1X  0.759  2,150,824
Chmicals  504.309  10.6X  9.422  89.12  0.789  397,719
Light  Industry  498.  178  10.5X  4.65X  44.52  1.056  525,945
Food  Processing  522,612  11.02  9.77T  64.32  0.964  493.089
Agriculture  198.333  4.2X  0.9b4  187,129
Building  Materials  20,228  0.42  *  18.174
Other  11.637  0.22  *  10,456
Total  4,766.154  100.02  52.21X  0.864  4,115,257
Imports  Actual  Share  in  Share  of  Share  of  Price  Value  in
1988  value  actual  trade  seaple  In  sample  In  relatives  1000  USD
(1000 TRbI)  total  trade  branch's  trade  (USD/TRbI)  Mean
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)
Mining  1t505,476  34.52  33.38%  96.72  0.879  1,323,144
Electricity  358.515  8.2Z  *  400,756
Metallurgy  477,377  11.0X  9.32%  85.12  1.993  951.313
Machinery  858,013  19.72  4.76G  24.22  0.920  789.181
Chemicals  700,328  16.12  9.16X  57.02  1.247  872,990
Light  Industry  325.858  7.52  4.80X  64.22  1.347  439.053
Food  Processing  43.483  1.02  0.12Z  11.42  0.598  27,218
Agriculture  59.822  1.42  0.21X  15.22  1.807  108,095
Building  Materials  23,868  0.52  0.37X  68.32  0.858  20.482
Other  4,062  0.12  *  4.540
Total  4,358.802  100.02  62.12X  1.134  4,936,772
*  For  sectors  with  an  ""  (which  are  generally  small),  no  price  survey  was  made  and  the  overall  saspte  average  was
employed.  This was .898 for  exports  and 1.118 for  imports.  The agriculture  and food processing  sectors  were
combined In  calculating  the  price  relative.27
TABLE  2.  COST  TO HUNGARY  OF THE SWITCH-OVER
TO CON.VERTIBLE  CURRENCY  TRADE
Adverse  Percentage
Change  in the  Bilateral
Income  Loss  Commodity
(Millions  of Dollarsi  Tlrms-of-Trade
1.  1988  Quantities
and Prices  800 - 1,200  17 - 24
2.  1990  Quantities  and
$21  per  barrel  oil  1,500  - 1,900W  30 - 37
3.  1988  Quantities  and
$21  per  barrel  oil  1,750  - 2,1502/  29 - 36
A/  For  each one-dollar  decrease  in the  price  of oil, the  estimated  costs  of
the  switch-over  will decrease  by US$76  million. The impact  of the  oil
price increase  on natural  gas,  coal  and  electricity  is incorporated.Table  3. Estimated  Initial  Relative
Price  effect  on  Domestic  Currency  (Forint)
in  Exporting  and  Importing  Industries
in  Hungary  from  the  Switch  Over
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)
Exporting  Relative  Cross  Relative  Subsidy  Cross  Exchange  Relative  Price
Industries  Price  Exchange  Price  in  Ratebl  Rate  by  Sector  in  Forint  after
in  the  Rate  in  Forint  after  63/[ 27. 5( 1+s)]JC  the  Switch-over
Soviet  Union  Hungary  the  switch-  Adjusting  for
(S/TR)  (63/27.5)  over  (Ignoring  Subsidies
Subsidies)
Metallurgy  2.182  2.29  5.0  0.56  1.47  3.20
Machinery  0.759  2.29  1.74  -0.14  2.67  2.02
Chemicals  0.789  2.29  1.81  -0.11  2.57  2.03
Light  Industry  1.056  2.29  2.42  0.22  1.88  1.99
Food  Processing  0.944  2.29  2.16  1.61  0.88  0.83
Agriculture  0.944  2.29  2.16  0.20  1.92  1.81
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)
Importing  Relative  Cross  Relative  Tax  Cross Exchange  Relative  Price
Industries  Price  Exchange  Price  in  Rateb/  Rate by Sector  in Forint  after
In  the  Rate  in  Forint  after  63/[27(1+t0]3  the  Switch-over
Soviet  Union  hungary  the  switch-  Adjusting  for
($/TR)  63/27  over  (Ignoring  Taxes
Taxes)}I
Mining  0.879  2.29  2.01  0.81  1.26  1.11
Metallurgy  1.993  2.29  4.57  0.38  1.66  3.31
Machinery  0.92  2.29  2.11  0.00  2.29  2.10
Chemicals  1.247  2.29  2.86  0.17  1.97  2.45
Light  Industry  1.347  2.29  3.09  0.18  1.94  2.62
Food  Processing  0.598  2.29  1.37  0.02  2.24  1.34
Agriculture  1.807  2.29  4.14  0.21  1.89  3.42
Bldg.  Materials  0.858  2.29  1.97  0.00  2.29  1.97
a/  Estimated number  of  forint  received  by exporters  after  the  switch-over  to  dollar  payment  with  the  Soviet Union for  each forint  currently  received
or  paid.
b/ Subsidy  and  tax  rates  are  calculated  on an ad valorem basis from the data  in Abel,  Hillman and Tarr  (1991).
c/  The cross-exchange rate  by sector  adjusts  for  the  subsidy rate  "s"  and the  tax  rate  "t".29
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